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Abstract: In this strictly positional paper we propose a general approach to 
bipolar knowledge representation, where the meaning of concepts can be 
modelled by examining their decomposition into opposite and neutral 
categories. In particular, it is the semantic relationship between the opposite 
categories which suggests the emergence of a paired structure and its 
associated type of neutrality, being there three general types of neutral 
categories, namely indeterminacy, ambivalence and conflict. Hence, the key 
issue consists in identifying the semantic opposition characterizing the meaning 
of concepts and at the same time the type of neutrality rising in between 
opposites. Based on this first level of bipolar knowledge representation, paired 
structures in fact offer the means to characterize a specific bipolar valuation 
scale depending on the meaning of the concept that has to be verified. In this 
sense, a paired structure is a standard basic structure that allows learning and 
building different valuation scales, leading to linear or even more complex 
valuation scales.  
Keywords: Bipolarity; Neutral concepts; Paired structures; Knowledge 
representation. 
1 Introduction 
Psychology and Neurology are providing relevant results for modelling human 
decision making. The human brain has specifically and successfully evolved to 
manage complex, uncertain, incomplete, and even apparently inconsistent 
information. For example, neurologists have shown that the part of the brain taking 
care of making up the last decision is different to the part of the brain in charge of the 
previous rational analysis of alternatives, being the first part associated to emotions 
[5], [6]. This is an extremely important result, as it suggests that different parts of our 
brain participate in our decision processes, each one following its own rules within a 
connected structure still under study. Among other key achievements, it has been 
recently shown the key role that concept representation plays in our knowledge 
process, along with the fact that the human brain manages positive information in a 
different way than negative information, suggesting some kind of bipolarity in the 
way that our brain handles information [11], [12]. In this way, positive and negative 
affects are not processed in the same region of the brain, as they are generated by 
clearly different neural processes [38]. 
The importance of bipolar reasoning in human activity was settled by Osgood, 
Suci and Tannenbaum in 1957 [35] -see also [26], [47]-, proposing a semantic theory 
based on the Semantic Differential scale for valuing the meaning of concepts. This 
theory became very popular for measuring attitudes in an easy way, where individuals 
are asked to use the Semantic Differential scale for valuing if a given object is 
perceived as being positive, neutral or negative. Thus, the object cannot be evaluated 
as being positive and negative at the same time. This led to some critics (see e.g. [12], 
[19], [26]) stating that the Semantic Differential scale does not consider other relevant 
attitudes like e.g. ambivalence, making it necessary to allow simultaneous positive 
and negative valuations. Thus, the neutral value that appears in a Semantic 
Differential scale can hardly be understood as a proper representation for certain 
attitudes that seem to escape the linear logic of such a scale. 
Therefore, it can be stated that our internal decision making process is of a 
complex nature, implying previous differentiated knowledge acquisition and 
representation processes (see e.g. [31], [32]), and quite often implying multi-criteria 
arguments. In fact, a 1-dimensional scale is too poor for modelling most of our 
problems, not giving room to the true conflicts we perceive from reality. Hence, once 
such a complexity is acknowledged, our mathematical modelling must continuously 
balance precision and simplicity, just as our brain looks for relevant but at the same 
time manageable information. Within such Multicriteria Decision Making framework 
(see e.g. [24]), the Semantic Differential scale of Osgood [35] is commonly known as 
the bipolar univariate model, while a somehow modified Semantic Differential scale 
(see e.g. [26]) consisting of two unipolar scales joined together, respectively allowing 
simultaneous positive and negative measurements, is commonly known as the 
unipolar bivariate model. A well-known example for the bipolar univariate model in 
decision theory is Cumulative Prospect Theory [54] and its generalization by means 
of the Choquet integral with respect to bi-capacities [25].  
Generally speaking, understanding concepts by their decomposition into opposite 
poles (meaningful opposites in the sense of Osgood [35]), enables us to capture the 
tension between somehow opposite arguments, a tension that is found in the way we 
understand most of the concepts we use. If an objective measure is not available, 
concepts in real life cannot be manipulated in an isolated manner, without taking into 
account their immediately related concepts. In some way, such simultaneous but 
somehow opposite views are unavoidable to start understanding the world, and indeed 
we need more complex knowledge structures to manage more than two views. But 
addressing two views is the minimum effort we should expect to acknowledge 
complexity. 
The point of departure of this paper are the above considerations, focusing our 
attention on the construction of basic structures that deal with the bipolar meaning of 
concepts (see [39] for a previous attempt), together with the associated neutrality that 
emerges from the tension between opposites or poles. Notice here that neutrality in 
our sense should not be confused with the neutral value in the traditional sense (see 
[15], [16], [17], [24], [35], among others), given that we refer to a neutral category 
which does not entail linearity between opposite poles. Instead, we will stress the 
existence of different kinds of neutrality that allow the representation of a number of 
concepts directly generated from the semantic relation between poles.  
Therefore, our proposal for examining bipolar knowledge representation is based 
on paired structures, understanding a paired structure as a basic structure allowing 
learning and building different valuation scales, not necessarily linear but more 
complex ones. In fact, what a paired structure represents is the semantic structure of 
its associated valuation scale. In this way, the measurement of the meaning of a 
concept, which occurs on the valuation scale, has proper sense only regarding its 
respective semantic structure. Hence, paired structures emerge from the semantic 
relation among opposites together with their characteristic neutrality, giving rise to a 
pertinent type of (bipolar) valuation scale. 
From our point of view, the key issue at a first stage of knowledge is the structure 
associated to the semantic relation between poles, and how neutral concepts are 
generated. Again, as pointed out in [31], there are many different ways of being in 
between poles, but such in-betweenness does not necessarily entail a neutral situation; 
instead, it can refer to a particular symmetry, as an element of a scale with no 
conceptual meaning but that of being somehow equidistant from poles (being not able 
to choose among poles does not necessarily imply a concept behind). Particularly, we 
consider that symmetries are not neutral concepts, since they are generated outside a 
semantic argument. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we shall give an example to 
fix our intuition. This example will be completed throughout the paper. Our proposal 
will be formalized in Section 3, where we explain what we understand by paired 
concepts and paired structures. In Section 4 we shall analyse in detail the types of 
neutrality rising from paired structures, followed by an example on preference 
modelling. In Section 5 we present the standard procedure for building paired 
structures, ending with some final comments briefly clarifying our position. 
Let us finally remark in this introduction that this paper is not about formal logic 
or its interpretation, but rather it deals with knowledge and natural language 
representation by means of logical tools. 
2 Preliminary Example: On the Representation and 
Measurement of Size 
Let us try to illustrate our view through an example. 
The meaning of size can be modelled based on some set of characteristic 
properties which can be somehow measured (subject to standard imprecision). Then, 
the measurement of a property occurs on a valuation scale which exists because there 
is a previous decomposition of the meaning of size, either as a 1-dimensional or n-
dimensional concept. In this way, if size is represented as e.g. size = height, the 
verification of its occurrence can be valued within the real line. That is, by taking the 
size of a person as height, we can refer to how tall that person is. Let us examine this 
meaning of size = height in more detail. 
Although we all know that height is measurable, we do not try to measure the 
height of each person we meet. Instead of saying “Paula’s height looks around 1.90 
meters”, most people will talk about Paula as a tall person, i.e., in terms of the tallness 
concept (which can be regarded as a fuzzy context-dependent concept [55]). Indeed, a 
person’s height is usually judged in terms of the concepts tall and short, which 
constitute the reference or semantic landmarks for the evaluation of such a feature. 
We hardly use the notion of a person’s height without the landmarks provided by the 
poles tall/short or any other equivalent pair. 
If our concept of tallness were crisp, the term “Paula is tall” would have a direct 
translation on the valuation scale in terms of height: for example, “Paula is tall” if and 
only if “Paula’s height is at least 1.70 meters”. As soon as we have this crisp 
definition, the concept of being non-tall is automatically created by the classical crisp 
negation: “Paula is non-tall” if and only if “Paula’s height is less than 1.70 meters”. 
That is, tallness is associated to the interval [1.70,∞) meanwhile non-tallness is 
associated to the interval (0,1.70). In order to generate such paired concepts, we 
simply need to assume the existence of the crisp negation: a person x within a 
community X belongs to the set of tall people within X if and only if the height h(x) of 
such a person is greater than or equal to 1.70. And a person x within the community X 
belongs to the set of non-tall people within X if and only if the height h(x) of such a 
person is smaller than 1.70. The set of tall people is Tall = {xϵX / h(x) ≥ 1.70}, and 
the set of non-tall people is Non-tall = {xϵX / h(x) < 1.70}. Within such a crisp 
context, no person can be tall and non-tall at the same time, and everybody will be 
either tall or non-tall. A simple paired structure to represent height has been built 
from only one concept (tallness) and its negation (non-tallness), and the characteristic 
functions of both crisp concepts 
     ( )      ( )            ( )      ( )       
         ( )      ( )                ( )      ( )       
are defined in such a way that  
     ( )   (         ( ))      
         ( )   (     ( ))      
being n:{0,1}→{0,1}, such that n(0) = 1 and n(1) = 0, the only negation within the 
crisp {0,1} framework (in fact, and within the crisp framework, the only one-to-one 
mapping from {0,1} into itself different from the identity mapping). 
Hence, tallness and non-tallness appear as paired concepts in a natural way within 
the crisp framework. But meanwhile a measurement of height is both available and 
precise, there is no room for any kind of neutral concept, although borders between a 
concept and its negation ({xϵX / h(x) = 1.70} in the above example) might deserve 
specific attention, precisely because of the potential imprecision in measurement. 
However, the introduction of short as the dual concept of tall allows different 
translations into measurable height, such that tallness and shortness exist now as 
paired concepts. 
For example, and keeping the crisp approach, we can define that “Paula is short” 
if and only if “Paula’s height is at most 1.60 meters”. Again the concept of non-short 
is automatically created, in such a way that Short = {xϵX / h(x) ≤ 1.60}, and the set of 
non-short people is Non-short = {xϵX / h(x) > 1.60}. In this way, all those people 
with height within the interval (1.60,1.70) are neither tall or short, leading to some 
kind of indeterminacy (we cannot assign any of the only two available concepts to 
some individuals). In this particular case we know that in order to solve this 
indeterminacy we can create an intermediate concept, like Medium = {xϵX / 1.60 < 
h(x) < 1.70}. But this is a different argument, conducted in a subsequent stage. At 
first, what we find from a semantic point of view is just that none of the two opposite, 
available concepts apply to some individuals. In general, indeterminacy represents 
this hesitant situation. That is, indeterminacy suggests the need of a new concept, 
which not necessarily will be an intermediate concept as Medium in the previous 
example. In fact, notice that the linearity between Tall-Medium-Short is due to the 1-
dimensionality of size = height, which in no way is the only possible meaning for size 
(please be aware of the specificity of this example, where the linear representation 
behind is a priori known and the two opposite concepts we have chosen correspond to 
left and right tails). 
On the other hand, we could have defined that “Paula is short” if and only if 
“Paula’s height is at most 1.80 meters”. In this case, Short = {xϵX / h(x) ≤ 1.80}. 
Then all those people with height within the interval [1.70,1.80] will be both tall and 
short, leading to a certain kind of ambivalence. That is, now what we find from a 
purely semantic point of view is that both opposite concepts simultaneously apply. 
Clearly, in this specific example it is again suggested to intersperse an intermediate 
concept in between the poles, like Medium = {xϵX / 1.70 ≤ h(x) ≤ 1.80}, and then 
reshape tallness and shortness to avoid overlapping, for example, Tall = {xϵX / h(x) > 
1.80} and Short = {xϵX / h(x) < 1.70}. Once more, the construction of a linear 
valuation scale (or equivalently, the interpretation of such ambivalence as an 
intermediate concept Medium) depends on a different, subsequent argument relying 
on a previous interpretation of the semantics of the poles and their relationship.   
Now, it is important to realize that tallness and shortness exist as paired concepts 
no matter if they can be translated into a measurable height.  
Our main argument is based upon the above observation: two opposite crisp 
concepts that refer to the same property, and depending on their semantics, can 
generate two neutral concepts (indeterminacy and ambivalence, or both). A more 
careful analysis of indeterminacy and ambivalence might suggest specific scales (see 
e.g. [27]) by modifying the definition of the two basic opposite concepts and/or 
introducing new intermediate concepts. But these valuation scales and their 
corresponding semantics can only be properly understood by firstly addressing the 
particular semantic relationship between the correspondent poles. And that is the role 
we give to paired structures, as well as the reason why we find it important to define 
and study them.  
In addition to indeterminacy and ambivalence, there is a third standard neutrality 
that can appear in more complex situations. In the above example we have based our 
arguments upon the existence of a unique, linearly-based property for understanding 
size, given by height. In practice, however, most of our concepts are complex in the 
sense that they can be decomposed into simpler concepts (see e.g. [23]). In this case, 
our evaluation proceeds through an (perhaps non conscious) aggregation process. 
For example, when talking about the size of a person we can define two opposite 
categories like big and small. But being a big or small person might depend on height 
(tall versus short) and weight (fat versus slim). Of course it may be the case that a 
person is neither big nor small, being there indeterminacy, and another person can be 
both big and small, being there ambivalence. But it can also happen that we cannot 
choose among the two concepts big and small because there is a conflict behind, i.e. 
both opposite concepts hold in a conflictive manner. It is not the same to say that a 
person is both big and small because it is simultaneously both tall and short and both 
fat and slim, than to say that such a person is big and small because it is tall but slim, 
or fat but short. In this more complex framework we can find conflict as a third kind 
of neutrality associated to opposite concepts, together with indeterminacy and 
ambivalence. 
To conclude this example, let us briefly illustrate the notion of point of symmetry. 
To this end, let us assume again that the meaning of size is interpreted solely in terms 
of the measurable characteristic height, and that our references are given by the 
predicates Tall and Not-tall, but let us now consider these as fuzzy (i.e. non-crisp) 
concepts. That is, we now allow both notions to be evaluated on the interval [0,1] 
rather than on the binary set {0,1}. Then, for any xϵX, for instance we may set the 
meaning of Tall and its complement to be represented by the fuzzy sets  
0                 if ( ) 1.70
( ) 1.70
( )  if 1.70 ( ) 1.80 , ( ) 1 ( )
1.80 1.70
1                  if ( ) 1.80
Tall Not tall Tall
h x
h x
x h x x x
h x
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

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. 
As usually admitted, this kind of representation enables both Tall and its 
complement to exhibit a somehow imprecise semantics, avoiding the boundary 
problems associated to crisp predicates. But, apart from that, we still have just a 
predicate and its complement as poles, which therefore fully explain the whole 
universe of discourse X, again leaving no room for any neutral concept. However, 
contrarily to the previous crisp context, now it is possible for an object to be equally 
associated to a pole and its complement, as now ( ) ( )Tall Not tallx x    can hold for a 
given object xϵX (i.e., whenever h(x) = 1.75). We refer to this situation by saying that, 
in a fuzzy context, a reference predicate and its complement admit a point of 
symmetry between them.  
It is important to stress that such point of symmetry does not represent a concept 
different than poles (either a neutral or an intermediate one): as exposed above, there 
are no other available options beside poles as these are complementary notions. 
Rather, in this situation we hesitate between both poles as a consequence of their 
imprecise, fuzzy semantics, which allows an object to be considered as e.g. half tall 
and half non-tall. This hesitation is clearly different from a semantic point of view to 
those associated to a situation of overlap (ambivalence), lack of covering 
(indeterminacy) or conflict between the poles. Particularly, a point of symmetry 
should not be confused with an intermediate concept between the poles: though both 
notions are somehow related to linear scales, the latter indeed represents a different 
valuation option from the poles, while the former represents just an equilibrium 
between them, only available due to the imprecise representation of these references. 
3 Semantic opposition and paired structures 
Let us study the relationships that can arise between a pair of concepts when these 
two concepts are semantically related, constituting the reference landmarks for a 
certain linguistic representation of reality. We will refer to those pairs of concepts 
fulfilling such relationship as paired concepts. We will use the term pole to refer to 
any of the two concepts being paired. Some concepts that constitute paired concepts 
are, as pointed out in the previous section, tall/short, fat/slim, big/small, but it is easy 
to find other examples such as cheap/expensive or good/bad (see e.g. [40]). 
3.1 Paired concepts 
Paired concepts are not simply a couple of concepts. These two concepts must 
somehow define a specific structure. Hence, our first objective is to clarify what we 
mean by paired. In fact, as pointed out above, our mind is able to represent complex 
situations, related to interests and emotions, by using a pair of landmarks or poles that 
constitute the references for evaluation. Such reference concepts or poles allow 
configuring the evaluation framework in which information can be assessed. In other 
words, they constitute the referential context in which pieces of information are 
understood. As shown in our preliminary example, only if size is assigned the 
meaning of height as tallness, and such meaning is translated into a valuation scale 
with its specific measure, only then we can be confused in thinking that tallness can 
be understood without shortness. Otherwise, if such a measure has not yet been 
provided, even the concept of tallness requires the concept of shortness in order to be 
understood.     
Hence, poles appear in pairs. We cannot understand most concepts without also 
knowing the meaning of those other concepts that define their limits. In this sense, 
two concepts have to be related in some specific way to effectively configure an 
appropriate referential context, i.e., in order to properly constitute a pair of reference 
landmarks. The previous arguments suggest the existence of a certain structure, which 
emerges from a pair of somehow opposite concepts, and constitutes the 
abovementioned evaluation framework arising from these reference poles. 
These ideas suggest that we should focus on the structural/semantic opposition 
between paired concepts. However, such opposition does not have a unique possible 
representation or definition, and the different opposition relationships between poles 
will in fact generate different structures.  
For example, very tall and very short are opposite concepts, and more or less tall 
and more or less short are also opposite concepts, but they indeed suggest very 
different spaces in between them (the first pair of poles cannot hold at the same time, 
while the second pair can). In this way, we refer to duality to capture in a general 
sense such a semantic opposition.  
3.2 Duality: negation, antonym and antagonism 
In this paper, we focus on three particular forms of such a duality relation, specifically 
negation, antonym and antagonism (see e.g. [48], [49], but also [41]).      
Before formalizing the meaning of these duality relationships, it is important to 
make explicit that we assume that any concept or predicate P (and thus particularly 
reference poles) can be represented as a fuzzy set 
P  over a particular universe of 
discourse X, in such a way that ( ) [0,1]P x   denotes the degree up to which an 
object x X  verifies predicate P. Nonetheless, notice that this assumption is not 
really necessary, as we would only need the predicate logic framework of classical or 
crisp sets (defined through a binary {0,1} scale instead of a continuous [0,1] scale). 
But as crisp sets are special instances of fuzzy sets, we study paired concepts as 
paired fuzzy sets for examining bipolar knowledge representation in a more general 
framework.  
In a first approach, we will also assume reference concepts or poles to be simple, 
in the sense of referring to a characteristic depending on just a single criterion or 
dimension (like tall and short refer to size = height), i.e. not admitting a further 
decomposition in a set of underlying criteria or sub-concepts. Later on we will 
remove this assumption and analyze also complex multidimensional reference 
concepts, as could be big/small or good/bad, which usually require a further 
decomposition and aggregation processes in a set of underlying criteria. 
Now, let us recall that a negation within the fuzzy context (see again [48], [49]) is 
usually understood as a non-increasing function :[0,1] [0,1]n   such that n(0) = 1 
and n(1) = 0. A strictly decreasing, continuous negation being also involutive (i.e. 
such that n(n(v)) = v for all v in [0,1]) is called a strong negation. If ( )F X  denotes 
the set of all fuzzy sets (i.e. predicates) over a given universe X, then any strong 
negation n determines a complement operator : ( ) ( )N F X F X  such that 
( )( ) ( ( ))N x n x   for any predicate ( )F X  and any object x X .  
On the other hand, an antonym operator was defined [50] as a mapping 
: ( ) ( )A F X F X  verifying,   
A1) 2A Id  (i.e. A is involutive);  
A2) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )x y A y A x       for all ( )F X  and ,x y X ; 
A3) A N  for a given complement operator N (i.e. A is sub-additive with respect to 
the complement operator N or, equivalently, with respect to the negation n that 
defines N). 
Finally, for the purposes of this paper we will refer to an antagonism or 
dissimilarity operator as a mapping : ( ) ( )D F X F X  that fulfils,  
D1) 
2D Id  (i.e. D is involutive); 
D2) ( ) ( )x y   ( )( ) ( )( )D y D x   for any ( )F X  and ,x y X .  
It is important to note that the main difference among antonym and antagonism 
operators lies on that antonyms are always sub-additive, in the sense of A3. In other 
words, the antonym always lies behind the complement, while antagonistic predicates 
could be over-additive, i.e. it could be that D ≥ N for a certain complement N. As we 
shall see, the distinction between sub-additive and over-additive duality operators is 
relevant as it reflects two essentially different semantic relationships between poles, 
not necessarily incompatible (two concepts can overlap while at the same time not 
fully explaining reality).  
Observe also that complement is a special case of antonym, as well as that 
antagonism somehow suggests a generalization for antonyms. Finally, note that all the 
considered duality operators (negation, antonym, dissimilarity) are involutive, i.e., 
they naturally define pairs of concepts related through duality.  
3.3 Paired structures 
Paired structures belong to a first level of (bipolar) knowledge representation. They 
stand as the subjacent structure that allows making sense of (bipolar) valuation scales, 
where neutrality is not simply a symmetry point but a concept in itself that requires 
further examination. With the purpose of exploring the nature of such neutrality, we 
propose to go further into the roots of bipolarity and go beyond standard valuation 
scales by dealing with paired concepts and paired structures. 
In a general sense, we consider that two concepts P,Q are paired if and only if P = 
D(Q), and thus also Q = D(P), holds for a certain semantic duality operator D. Then, 
we assume that two paired concepts provide semantic references for a linguistic 
assessment of a characteristic, in such a way that a semantic structure emerges from 
these two referential notions. We refer to these semantic valuation structures as paired 
structures. Our point is that, besides the original pair of opposite references, a paired 
structure emerges together with its neutral concepts, as a consequence of the specific 
semantic relationship holding among opposite poles. 
In this paper we are mainly concerned with analysing the features of these paired 
structures, and particularly (as it will be shown throughout this paper) the manner in 
which the semantic relationship between paired concepts determines both the 
semantic valuation structure arising from them and its representative power.  
A first observation is that negation (in the sense of complement) not-P of a 
concept P cannot be viewed as a different concept from P, as it happens with 
antonyms and antagonists. Not only it does not add qualitatively different 
information, but it is kind of unnatural to estimate not-P independently from P 
(moreover, we should also remind that intuition works with positively defined 
concepts, and negation itself is not positively defined, see e.g. [14], but also [31]). 
This is a key issue whenever we look for the possibility that two opposite or dual 
concepts generate additional neutral concepts from their semantics. Still, it should be 
noticed that we refer to a semantic argument to define a paired structure. Therefore, 
although in our opinion antonym and antagonistic relationships represent the proper 
framework for paired structures, it is true that negation or complement appears as a 
very specific case of semantic opposition (see e.g. [52]). In this sense, a concept and 
its negation indeed constitute a paired structure that implies a particular empty space 
between poles, and in fact, duality operators different from negation allow generating 
additional neutral concepts in between poles. 
As suggested in the preliminary example, neutrality may arise in different 
manners, whenever an object fails to be fully explained from the two reference 
concepts, denoting a situation that in turn is related to different types of hesitation 
regarding the poles. Neutrality will in fact represent a different concept from the 
poles, another relevant available option for evaluating objects. And depending on the 
circumstances, such neutrality can suggest to search for an alternative symmetrical 
category (like in the tall/short example a medium category was suggested from the 
existence of ambivalence or indeterminacy). Particularly, different paired structures 
(arising from different semantic relationships between the poles) are able to represent 
different types of neutrality in our knowledge about reality. Again, we stress our key 
idea that a paired structure requires two opposite or dual concepts, together with a 
semantic building procedure leading to the emergence of new neutral valuation 
concepts. The existence of such neutrality, which is a consequence of the semantic 
relationship between opposite concepts, will sometimes be definitive in order to 
identify the particular paired structure we are dealing with. 
4 Neutrality 
Neutral concepts are generated from two opposite concepts whenever an object 
cannot be properly explained in terms of the poles. From a fuzzy approach, the point 
here is that the two poles may not form a fuzzy partition of the universe of discourse, 
see [44] or any of its generalizations based upon any alternative logic (e.g. [13], but 
particularly [1], [2]). In this context, the term neutral means that besides the character 
or semantics of both poles, their relationship implies the existence of an additional 
concept that applies to those objects that cannot be properly explained from poles.  
But as suggested in [31], there are different types of neutrality or neutral categories.  
4.1 Types of neutrality 
Examining the bipolar opposition holding among paired concepts, it may be on the 
one hand that both poles somehow overlap [8], suggesting that both poles may be 
reshaped to create some middle concept between the new poles. On the other hand, it 
may be that objects cannot be fully explained solely in terms of the given poles, 
suggesting the search for an additional concept [10]. Moreover, poles might show 
some conflictive behavior. The particular neutrality we find depends on the semantic 
relationship between our paired references (in the next section we shall describe a 
building procedure to obtain our paired structures and their associated neutral 
concepts). Let us now concentrate in describing some of the different ways of being in 
between poles and the types of neutral concepts that can appear within paired 
structures. 
Let us start by analysing the case of a paired structure given by a predicate P and 
its complement Q = N(P) ≡ not-P. As discussed above, the complement not-P of a 
concept P is not logically independent of P, and thus the former does not actually 
define a different category nor provides different information from that of the original 
concept P. That is, complementation constitutes a very specific semantic relationship, 
in which the references just allude to the verification or lack of verification of a single 
concept or pole. In this way, when for example we conceive size = height as 
expressed in terms of two complementary references (e.g., tall and non-tall), we are in 
fact just measuring a single notion, since any verification degree of tall corresponds to 
an inverse degree of verification of non-tall.  
Hence, neutral concepts can only arise when we really deal with two logically 
independent poles. As already shown, in a binary {0,1} setting, if the valuation 1 is 
assigned to e.g. tall people, then non-tall people obtain the valuation 0. Thus, there is 
no room for anything else, since both references are understood as crisp, precise 
notions that complement each other to cover the whole universe of discourse.  
Notice that, in case we admit a pair of complementary references to be modelled 
as fuzzy (instead of crisp) predicates, basically the same situation remains to hold. 
That is, in a fuzzy context a predicate and its negation are still not logically 
independent, and also they are still able to explain the entire universe of discourse. 
Therefore, again no neutral concepts can arise in this setting.  
However, a fuzzy representation enables the modelling of a certain kind of 
linguistic uncertainty, usually associated to imprecise predicates. And, as pointed out 
at the end of Section 2, this linguistic imprecision now allows a predicate and its 
negation to simultaneously hold, up to a certain degree, for a given object. In this 
sense, for instance, an individual can be assessed as being both half tall and half not-
tall. This leads to a particular hesitation, as we find difficulties to choose between 
both references, although such hesitation does not suggest a third, different concept to 
come into play. Rather, the individual is adequately explained in terms of the 
available pair of references, but their imprecise nature admits the emergence of a 
symmetry point expressing an equilibrium or balance between them. Thus, in 
accordance with the discussion at the beginning of this section, symmetry points 
neither represent a concept (or valuation alternative) different from the poles (as 
intermediate concepts or symmetries do represent) nor they are to be considered a 
specific kind of neutrality (in the sense given in the introduction of this paper).     
More formally, given a strong negation n and assuming that a membership 
function is associated to complementary poles, in such a way that   ( )( )  
 (  ( ))     , a (fuzzy) symmetry point can be found when   ( )( )  
  ( ) for a certain    . Notice that, since n is a negation, the latter equality can 
only take a single value restricted to the interval (0,1), and in fact it takes the value 
0.5 in case we use the standard negation n(x) = 1 – x.  
A similar scenario is reached if we allow probabilistic uncertainty instead of 
linguistic uncertainty, i.e., if we consider the poles as events with an associated 
probability for any object in consideration. As long as both poles are considered as 
complementary notions, they cover the whole sample space, leaving no room for 
other alternative events. Then, a (probabilistic) symmetry point is found whenever the 
probabilities of both poles are equal for a certain object (in which case they are to be 
equal to 0.5).  
Thus, in case of complementary references, neither fuzzy nor probabilistic 
uncertainty by themselves can lead to the apparition of neutral concepts or 
symmetries constituting valuation alternatives different from the poles. That is, the 
crucial point in order to enable the emergence of neutral concepts is not whether the 
modelling of our references admits a fuzzy or probabilistic representation of 
uncertainty, but whether our references are complementary or not.  
Before dropping the assumption of complementary references, let us briefly 
consider an aspect in relation with the estimation of exact membership or probability 
degrees. Such degrees are usually introduced in order to enable the modelling of 
certain kind of uncertainty, either linguistic or probabilistic. But at the moment of 
estimating these degrees, we may easily have to face a different kind of uncertainty, 
related to the difficulty of choosing an exact value for them. To some extent, 
depending on the context and the specific problem being addressed, we may be forced 
to admit that our valuations or degrees are subject to some imprecision regarding its 
estimation. Thus, such an estimation imprecision represents a different kind of 
uncertainty from those usually associated to imprecise predicates or uncertain events, 
in fact a kind of uncertainty related to the way we express other uncertainties in our 
models. Particularly, it is possible to allow a range of imprecision levels for our 
estimations, in such a way that absolute imprecision may be taken to represent an 
alternative case of symmetry between poles, expressing ignorance or lack of 
knowledge. Instances of such absolute imprecision can be found, for example, when 
we can only state that the actual probability value is simply between [0,1] (see [46]), 
or that the actual degree of membership is simply between [0,1] (see [45]). In both 
situations we find a certain hesitation to choose among the poles, in this case due to a 
lack of knowledge. But such an absolute estimation imprecision should not be 
considered as a neutral concept, as it is not created from the semantic tension between 
the poles.  
However, as stated above, the situation changes qualitatively when we move to the 
case of a pair of poles (P,Q) related through a non-trivial duality operator D, such that 
P = D(Q) and Q = D(P) are not complementary poles.  
Let us start by considering the poles as related through an antonym or sub-additive 
duality operator A, such that Q = A(P). If each pole is contained in the complement of 
the other pole we can assume that they are logically independent. That is, we cannot 
obtain one pole from the other by means of a logical operation, but necessarily as a 
consequence of a semantic operation. Thus, each pole provides different information, 
allowing potential neutral concepts within such a paired structure. As a consequence 
of the sub-additive nature of the involved semantic operator, both poles are somehow 
separated (in the sense of not covering the whole universe of discourse), leaving 
space for some objects that could not verify either one pole or the other. This is not a 
situation in which we hesitate about whether an object verifies a pole or not, but one 
in which we are quite sure that reference concepts cannot fully explain an object. This 
type of neutrality, which we call indeterminacy, is therefore different to the 
imprecision symmetry, and it is not necessarily associated to a fuzzy representation 
framework, but to an idea of separation between poles.  
For example if we consider the semantic references given by the poles very tall 
and very short, it is quite likely that, when applied to any appropriate universe of 
discourse (for instance the students in a classroom), there can be some individual who 
cannot be considered as either very tall or very short. This produces an indeterminacy 
which should not be confused with a degree of half-verification of both poles. Instead, 
indeterminacy strongly suggests the search for more information, perhaps in order to 
introduce a new category, maybe half-a-way in a linear order where poles stand as 
extreme values. But indeterminacy does not necessarily lead to such a linear scale. 
Consider now that the poles are related through an antagonistic over-additive 
duality operator D, such that Q = D(P). Thus, each logically independent pole 
provides different information, and as a consequence of the over-additive nature of 
the semantic operator, both poles are somehow overlapping (in the sense of 
redundantly covering the universe of discourse and leaving no space in between 
poles). As previously stated, this is not a situation in which we know that reference 
concepts cannot fully explain an object, but one in which we are not sure which one 
of those concepts fully explains the object. Then, this type of neutrality, which we call 
ambivalence, is also different to the imprecision symmetry, not necessarily associated 
to a fuzzy representation framework, but to an idea of redundancy in between poles.  
As an instance, consider now the references not very short and not very tall for 
understanding the size = height of an individual. Some extremely short and extremely 
tall students can fail to verify either pole (indeterminacy). But certainly some students 
can fulfil both opposite references, being not very tall and not very short, at the same 
time, thus producing ambivalence between poles. In a fuzzy classification context (see 
again [1], [2]), the appearance of ambivalence would signal overlapping classes, 
suggesting the search for more restricted references or classes that exclude the 
overlap.  
In the previous examples we started from the opposition between a pole and its 
negation, in the simplest case, or between two dual poles, but in both cases we are 
assuming that these references are modelled based on a simple, 1-dimensional 
underlying criterion or characteristic. In many contexts, however, the poles are rather 
complex dual concepts (as good/bad or big/small, for example), that show a multi-
dimensional nature and suggest decomposition in terms of simpler reference concepts. 
This situation can be associated to a multi-criteria framework, in which the 
verification of a pair of poles is necessarily obtained through the aggregation of 
several criteria. It is in this context where conflict can naturally appear as another type 
of neutrality. Such conflict should be naturally expected within multi-criteria paired 
structures, whenever serious arguments for both poles are simultaneously found in 
different, independent criteria (like when in the big/small example we find that 
someone is simultaneously very tall but very slim). This situation suggests that 
complex poles can show a kind of conflictive relation, different to the ambivalent 
overlapping associated to redundant poles over a simple, 1-dimensional characteristic. 
This type of neutrality relates to another different hesitation, associated to a 
disagreement or collision between arguments that refer to different criteria. In fact, 
this conflict should not be expected when dealing with paired structures on a 1-
dimensional argument. Such colliding arguments get a clear meaning only within 
multi-criteria paired structures, once poles are understood as complex positively-
defined dual concepts that harvest families of underlying independent arguments. Of 
course, different kinds of conflict can be acknowledged in higher multi-dimensional 
problems besides the above conflict between two underlying criteria. 
4.2 Example: preference representation 
To conclude this section, let us introduce now a brief example in which the previous 
ideas are illustrated in the context of preference modelling and representation. In our 
opinion, preference models constitute a particularly adequate framework to illustrate 
some issues of paired structures in relation with bipolar knowledge representation 
models and how all those neutralities can simultaneously appear in practice.     
Let us remind that preference models are typically based on the pairwise 
comparison of decision alternatives in relation with a family of preference predicates. 
For instance, we may analyse two possible holyday trips, let us denote them by x and 
y, in terms of whether we consider x to be clearly preferred to y. The implicit 
comparison predicate in this case is more preferred than, which is usually referred as 
the strict preference predicate. Note that we can carry out the comparison the other 
way round, applying the same strict preference predicate to the same two alternatives, 
but switching the order of x and y, so in this case we would be analysing whether y is 
strictly preferred to x. Such reversed predicate is also referred as the inverse strict 
preference, and in practice we need at least both predicates (a preference and its 
inverse) in order to devise the preference relationship between x and y. This allows 
understanding preference models in terms of a bipolar representation framework, 
since a preference and its inverse in fact play the role of opposite references (poles), 
from which other predicates (like indifference or incomparability) could be defined, 
as usually are, in order to enable capturing a wider spectrum of preference attitudes 
and produce more realistic representation models. The set of all considered or allowed 
predicates constitutes then a preference structure, in which some relations among the 
different predicates should hold (in order to acquire an actual structural performance, 
see again [31]), and which represents the fundamental valuation structure or scale for 
preference representation.  
Then, our point is that a preference structure cannot be understood unless we 
consider both the semantic relationship between the basic preference predicates from 
which the structure is built, and how the different preference predicates are related to, 
and obtained from, the configuration of those basic references. That is, a preference 
structure constitutes an instance of second-level valuation structure, in which the 
semantics of its components is based on a particular interpretation of the first-level 
structure arising from the opposing references. In other words, preference structures 
rely on an underlying paired structure, from which the semantics of the different 
preference predicates is developed in terms of their relationship with the references 
and the different neutralities arising from their semantic opposition. 
For instance, in preference representation it is usually admitted (see e.g. the 
classical book of Von Neumann and Morgenstern [34], as well as [21]) that a strict 
preference and its inverse can simultaneously fail to hold for some pairs of objects. 
Then, since neither of the poles are verified, a neutral indeterminacy is reached, which 
is usually interpreted as a preference predicate of indifference, constituting an 
additional intermediate concept in preference structures. However, it is important to 
note that assigning the meaning of indifference to such indeterminacy does not belong 
to the semantic relation between poles. In fact, at a first semantic level such 
indeterminacy is just saying that x is not strictly preferred to y, and that neither y is 
preferred to x. It could be that in fact x and y are not comparable, or that we have not 
enough information or knowledge to state any preference judgement. Thus, such a 
meaning of indifference is only acquired through a set of assumptions taken to 
produce a specific second level interpretation of the underlying paired structure. 
On the other hand, indifference can also hold if we are considering weak 
preferences instead of strict preferences as opposite poles (remind that a weak 
preference, represented by the predicate at least as preferred as, is just the negation of 
the inverse strict preference). In fact, it is usually admitted (see for instance [21]) that 
a weak preference and its inverse weak preference can overlap, thus defining a 
different ambivalent category available for the first-level valuation of pairs of 
alternatives. However, assigning the meaning of indifference to such ambivalence 
again depends on a subsequent, second-level argument taken to interpret the 
neutralities of the underlying paired structure.      
Another issue of paired structures that preference models help to illustrate is that 
of the simultaneous appearance of the different types of neutrality. In the previous 
examples related to the height of a group of students, we explicitly assumed that the 
involved duality operator was sub-additive (over-additive). This enabled the 
emergence of indeterminacy (ambivalence) as the specific type of neutrality 
associated to such duality operator, but at the same time it excluded the emergence of 
ambivalence (indeterminacy). However, general duality operators are not constrained 
to be either sub-additive or over-additive, thus allowing the different types of 
neutrality to appear together in the same paired structure and be assigned to different 
objects, in such a way that an object may be associated to indeterminacy while 
another one may verify ambivalence, or any other kind of neutrality. That is, the 
different types of neutrality are not mutually exclusive, but they can appear 
simultaneously in a paired structure as a consequence of the particular semantic 
relationship between the references. This is particularly usual and relevant in 
preference models, in which different objects (i.e., pairs of alternatives) may be 
associated to different preference predicates, in turn arising from different first-level 
neutralities.  
For example, within preference representation (see [21], [43], but also [33]), we 
may use the following terms when comparing two alternatives x and y:        
- x is preferred to y (strict preference x>y); 
- y is preferred to x (strict preference y>x); 
- x outranks y (weak preference x≥y); 
- y outranks x (weak preference y≥x); 
- x is equivalent to y (indifference x~y); 
- x is in conflict with y (incomparability x‖y); 
- Ignorance (lack of knowledge regarding the preference status of x and y). 
Notice that all these preference predicates can appear and be applied within the 
same decision problem, and that they may in turn be associated to different available 
valuations of the underlying paired structure. For instance, when dealing with strict 
preferences as poles, as stated above, indeterminacy is usually interpreted as 
indifference, and the overlap of these references is usually associated to a conflict 
(arising from a collision on different underlying criteria), in turn commonly 
interpreted as incomparability. Note also that while the first six relations are standard 
in preference representation (see again [21], [33], [43]), the last one should be 
introduced to prevent lack of information, or simply to model the initial ignorance 
stage when we have not enough information to discriminate between alternatives [31]. 
To some extent, this last category may be associated to a state of absolute imprecision 
in our estimation of the basic preference degrees (as we do not have any idea of what 
degrees to assign).     
In summary, let us stress that different types of neutrality may appear depending 
on the semantic duality relating the poles. But it is the existing semantic relationship 
between poles determines the particular meaning of the different types of neutrality 
that may arise, and at the same time, of the whole paired structure. All these kinds of 
neutrality are quite often confused (and labelled under the same word) since they all 
provoke hesitation. However, the point here is that behind each one of those 
hesitancies or neutralities underlies a different informative status. 
5 Building paired structures 
Not stressing the structural issue, as pointed out in [31], implies certain potential 
doubts about basic issues, starting from the concept of pole itself. The concept of pole 
should be precisely described; otherwise it will not be possible to distinguish any 
arbitrary couple of concepts from a paired approach. Moreover, the role and meaning 
of the neutral element should be also clarified. If structural issues are not properly 
addressed in our mathematical model, we might be easily confused between different 
approaches simply because the proposed mathematical models appear as isomorphic. 
But such one-to-one correspondence is only due to the fact that the existing relations 
between elements have not been made explicit. This was the main issue raised in [31], 
in order to explain the intuitionistic discussion underlying Dubois, Gottwald, Hajek, 
Kacprzyk and Prade [14] and Atanassov [4]. Our mathematical models should focus 
on capturing all the essential aspects of reality. Listing elements should be 
accompanied of their associated structure, by describing the relation between those 
elements. It is the structural difference what justifies a denomination, not the other 
way round. Structural performance of a set of concepts does not come with a set of 
isolated objects or names. If these elements suggest a structure, such a structure 
should be formally stated. 
We offer now a standard procedure to build up paired structures: 
1) As already stressed, we start from a concept and its negation (only one option in 
the crisp case). Such negation is a must in our model, since it defines what’s inside 
and outside our original concept. But a concept and its negation are paired concepts 
that cannot generate any additional concept, since both contain the same information. 
2) Then, we need a dual concept, different from such a negation. In this way we 
obtain two paired concepts whose semantic relation will generate additional and 
specific neutral concepts. 
3) In case our original concept and its dual concept do not overlap (dual concept 
implies negation), indeterminacy arises (both paired concepts do not fully explain 
reality, and it is suggested a search for additional information, perhaps a new 
intermediate concept or symmetry). 
4) In case our original concept and its dual concept overlap, ambivalence arises (the 
existence of a new concept associated to such overlapping is suggested together with 
a reshaping of the poles into more precise concepts).  
5) Of course indeterminacy and ambivalence can appear simultaneously (overlapping 
in some objects might suggest ambivalence and lack of fulfilment in some other 
objects might suggest indeterminacy).  
6) We can also detect conflict if our paired concepts are viewed in our mind as 
complex concepts that can be decomposed into and aggregated from simpler 
concepts. 
7) Each one of those simpler concepts is subject to the previous arguments (a pole, its 
negation, its dual concept and potential indeterminacy, ambivalence, conflict, …) 
As previously discussed, a fuzzy (or probabilistic) representation is not actually 
needed in order to define a paired structure and enable the emergence of the 
abovementioned types of neutrality. In fact, the main difference between a crisp and a 
fuzzy approach is the increased complexity of estimating fuzzy membership functions 
for all the involved concepts, both the references and the neutral ones. That is, our 
original concept here comes with a membership function, that should be estimated, 
and according to a particular fuzzy negation, we shall obtain the estimated 
membership function of the complementary concept. But the degree of membership to 
our dual concept should be also estimated. Then, some objects might suggest 
indeterminacy, other objects might suggest ambivalence, and others might suggest 
conflict.  Membership functions of all these neutral concepts should be also estimated, 
since it is natural to assume that in such a fuzzy context these neutral concepts will 
also be gradable. Symmetry points may arise in this context whenever the degrees of 
membership to a concept and its negation are the same. However, symmetry points 
are associated to equilibrium between imprecise references, and thus they do not 
properly define new intermediate concepts or valuation alternatives different from the 
poles. All these steps also apply in case of a probabilistic representation, although 
now we have to estimate the probability distributions of all the involved concepts 
instead of their membership functions.  
Both in case we deal with probabilities or membership functions (no matter if they 
are defined in the unit interval or in any other scale) we are subject to an estimation 
imprecision problem. If we cannot estimate exact values, it may be important to 
represent such uncertainty by means of a more complex formalism. A standard 
solution is to consider some kind of type II probabilities or fuzziness (see [28] and the 
book edited by Bustince, Herrera and Montero [9]). But an easy approach to 
imprecision is to associate an interval to each imprecisely estimated value. The wider 
such an interval is, the more imprecise our estimation. Maximum imprecision will be 
then associated to the complete interval, which would mean that we simply do not 
have any useful information about such estimated value (see [46] for a complete 
approach within a probabilistic framework, and [45] for the seminal approach within a 
fuzzy one). However, as previously discussed, this symmetric situation should not be 
associated to a concept generated from the semantic relationship between the poles. 
6 Final comments 
In this paper we have presented a systematic approach to different types of paired 
sets, to be considered as an alternative to the notion of bipolarity proposed by Zhang 
and Zhang [56] and particularly by Dubois and Prade [15], [16], [17], both deeply 
related to Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets [3]. All these models are somehow 
based upon two basic opposite concepts (but see [31]). The main aim of this strictly 
positional paper is to bring some light into this discussion, stressing the constructive 
argument towards a more general structure that should particularly stress the role of 
neutral concepts. We postulate that paired structures represent the basic model for 
most learning processes, which quite often starts from two opposite concepts (see also 
[20], [30]). Our approach introduces semantics as a key aspect to be taken into 
account. It is particularly stressed that if the semantic structure of the model is not 
properly specified, we might be confused by different structures that share equivalent 
underlying lattices but not a common semantics. In fact, it has been shown that each 
particular semantic relationship between the poles refers to a specific structure that 
generates characteristic neutral concepts.  
We therefore claim that the term paired should be mainly associated to the 
existence of two different but dual concepts whose relation can create specific neutral 
concepts. In this sense, 
- If properties associated to both poles are non-overlapping antonymous 
concepts, they cannot simultaneously hold, and they produce a neutral 
element to represent indeterminacy (which should not be confused with an 
intermediate category within a linear scale). This should be in our opinion 
the right allocation of Atanassov’s Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets [3] (avoiding the 
“non-membership” as the opposite pole to “membership”, as pointed out in 
[31]).  
- If properties associated to both poles imply overlapping antagonistic 
concepts, they allow a neutral element to represent ambivalence (which in 
certain contexts might be acknowledged as an intermediate value within a 
linear scale). 
- If properties associated to both poles are conceived as complex, they may 
allow a neutral element to represent conflict. 
Hence, we find at least three different neutral aspects that paired concepts can 
create: indeterminacy (which can be later on justified in terms of lack of information 
or poorness of the system defined by the poles if viewed as a classification system), 
ambivalence and conflict. It is the specific semantic tension (opposition) between our 
two basic poles the key aspect to be analysed. Of course these three different 
neutralities can appear in the same problem, together with other representations of 
uncertainty and imprecision. How we can simultaneously manage all these parameters 
becomes a suggesting and necessary objective for future research. 
As a consequence, we see three main types of paired fuzzy sets:  
- Those “basic” paired concepts based upon the negation of both poles, with 
no additional neutral concept being allowed. 
- Those “dual” paired concepts based upon a 1-dimensional duality, subject to 
antonym or antagonistic components, but allowing indeterminacy and 
ambivalence neutralities. 
- And those “complex” paired concepts based upon multidimensional 
dualities, where in addition to indeterminacy and ambivalence we can find 
different levels of conflict. 
A possible drawback of the general case of paired fuzzy structures is that they can 
be considered too complex for some applications, since it might imply the direct 
estimation of quite a number of degrees of verification, for each object. An alternative 
approach is to consider that some degrees of membership or membership functions 
can be obtained from a smaller subset of estimations, by means of appropriate 
operators previously defined. Hence, the whole system can be fully described from a 
few basic estimations. Notice that, to some extent, this is similar to what is usually 
done in preference modelling: see e.g. [21], [33] and particularly [29], or the 
extensions into Belnap’s logic [7] in [36], [51]. It is also interesting to see the 
similarities between fuzzy preference structures in [21], [22], and the continuous 
extension proposed in [36] and [37], further analysed in [42] and [53]. In all these 
examples, aggregation plays a crucial role in constructing and constraining the 
semantics of different notions from that of the reference concepts (see e.g. [18]).    
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